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The  development  of  the  Semantic  Web  (SW)  raises  a  number  of  difficult  and 
interesting technical issues. Less often remarked, however, are the social and political 
debates that it will engender, if and when the technologies become widely accepted. 
As the SW is a technology for transferring information and knowledge efficiently and 
effectively, then many of these questions have an epistemological base. In this paper I 
want to focus especially on the epistemological underpinnings of these social issues, 
to think about the interaction between the epistemological and the political. How does 
technology affect the social networks in which it is embedded? How can technology 
be successfully transplanted into a new context? And, perhaps most importantly for 
us, how is technology affected by its context? In particular, I want to look at how our 
decisions  about  how  we  treat  knowledge  can  impact  quite  dramatically  on  the 
technologies we produce. 
Let us begin with a familiar diagram, the layered view of the SW developed in the 
very  early  stages  by  Tim  Berners-Lee  and  colleagues  (Figure  1).  Knowledge  of 
different types is separated out (ontologies appearning in the middle). And by making 
this separation, we can see how the semanticity of the Semantic Web comes about. 
The technical machinery of Unicode and URIs appears at the bottom; XML can be 
used to tell the computer what objects this code is concerned with. RDF tells us that 
those objects are related in various ways. Ontologies give a context for the object 
types and relation types. We then need logic and inference engines to make context-
sensitive inferences over our knowledge bases. Proof theory tells us the properties of 
our inference engines – soundness and completeness etc. And finally, there’s no point 
being proven innocent if no one trusts the method of proof. 
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Hence,  ontologies  are  central  to  the  vision  of  information  aggregation  and 
manipulation  underlying  the  Semantic  Web.  Ontology-mediation  within  services 
enables  much  to  happen;  they  can  steer  the  knowledge  acquisition  process, 
choreograph the integration of information from diverse sources and representational 
formats, assemble retrieved information into customised packages, and hence present 
information  to  the  right  people  in the  right  form,  bring  intelligence to  the  search 
process, undercutting the direct human input to the drudge work. 
An example of an ontology-mediated system which exploits the new expressivity that 
the SW allows is the winner of the 2003 Semantic Web Challenge, CS AKTive Space 
(Shadbolt et al 2004), which gives an up-to-date snapshot of the state of the discipline 
of computer science in Britain. But the point of view of the snapshot is determined by 
the user. In a massive knowledge acquisition exercise, various different technologies 
assemble  giant  quantities  of  research-related  information  from  the  websites  of 
computer science departments, the EPSRC and so on. This is all collected on a regular 
basis, and converted into RDF. The RDF store contains tens of millions of triples, and 
the space enables the user to query that store to ask specific questions about British 
computer science. Who is working on what? Who is working with whom? Where are 
the  geographical  concentrations  of  researchers?  Which  areas  are  receiving  the 
funding? Who are the top people in different areas? 
Ontology mediation is central to this flexibility in the presentation and selection of 
information; how does this impinge on the social aspects of the SW?  
There are two ways in which the Semantic Web can be seen as social. The first is that, 
as we ascend Figure 1, the layers become increasingly socially rooted. In other words, 
even though all of these layers are amenable to technical solutions (even trust, a social 
phenomenon par excellence, can be addressed technically, as we see, of course, in the 
agents community, and increasingly in Semantic Web services), as we move up, each 
layer  is  more  beholden  to  social  phenomena.  No  matter  how  good  the  technical 
solutions provided, as we move along the direction of the arrow, those solutions must 
respect  more,  and  more  complex,  social  phenomena.  They  can  be  criticised  by 
pointing out that, no matter how impressive the solution, it fails to capture some vital 
aspect of reality. 
The other social aspect of the SW is common to all technologies: it exists in a context, 
and  is  intended  to  move  in  other  contexts.  It  will  be  crucially  affected  by 
developments  and  demands  from  the  economic  world,  information  security  and 
assurance, defence and government, organisational and managerial innovations, the 
entertainment industry, and,  not  least, academe.  We  have already  seen  this  social 
influencing with the World Wide Web. The Web was an interesting space for action, 
and developed accordingly, but when people wanted to use their credit cards online, 
suddenly  a  new  set  of  research  imperatives  was  created,  to  do  with  security  and 
identity verification. We must expect analogous events in the future of the SW. 
We  must  also  not  forget  that  these  influences  are  two-way.  Technologies  are 
transformative, and the Semantic Web may well affect the structures and practices in 
all these areas. 
If we take these social aspects of knowledge seriously, then we need to move away 
from traditional epistemology (O’Hara 2002). In this view, knowledge is a kind of 
Platonic entity. We can “tap into it” when we have some kind of knowledge system, 
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our ordinary educational learning. In other words, knowledge is abstract, and then is 
concretely  represented  more  or  less  well.  On  this  view,  we  might  see  the  ideal 
knowledge  transfer  process  as  like  a  frictionless  plane,  where  no  content  is  lost 
through the transfer process, and the Internet as some superconducting medium which 
can approximate that. 
We need to switch to a more materialist view, where what we expect is a series of 
more  or  less  costly  translations  from  form  to  form,  representative  mode  to 
representative mode (O’Hara 2002). Each translation from form to form may well lose 
content, or involve generating new knowledge. Rightness or wrongness of translation 
is a factor, but so is correctness for the task. In other words, knowledge manipulation 
is conceived of as a material process, using resources. Friction cannot be avoided, 
even on the Internet (Fuller 2002). 
What we are talking about is the codification of knowledge. Knowledge has certain 
properties; there are things it can do in the world, depending on how it is represented, 
and what institutional forms lie behind it. Codifying it in a certain way will affect 
those properties. For example, one radical type of codification is what the knowledge 
management theorists Nonaka and Takeuchi call externalisation (Nonaka & Takeuchi 
1995). This takes tacit knowledge, know-how or knowledge that people possess but 
has not been written down, and explicitly creates a codified, or explicit, version of the 
know-how.  We  can  study  the  effects  of  codification  using  externalisation  as  a 
common type of example. 
There  are  many  advantages  of  codification,  of  tailoring  knowledge  to  one’s 
organisational needs: it is easier to move knowledge around the organisation; sharing 
and  retrieving  it  is much simpler; you don’t need a person who actually  has this 
knowledge  tacitly  in  their  head  to  be  present.  And  when  the  owner  leaves  the 
organisation, the knowledge stays behind, in the manuals, the computer, the Intranet, 
or wherever the explicit codification is held. 
Furthermore, the codified knowledge has become an asset; it is now saleable. It can 
act as the basis for a patent or copyright. The organisation can be granted monopoly 
rights for a period over the knowledge, and if others want to use it they will need to 
purchase a licence. 
And finally, codification converts knowledge from what economists call a rival good 
to a non-rival good, i.e. it is now such that many people can use it at the same time. 
When the knowledge was tacit, then the owner had to be present when the knowledge 
was used. If he or she was needed at two places at once, they would have to prioritise, 
because tacit knowledge is a rival good. But once the knowledge is on the Intranet, for 
example, different people can download it at the same time (Cowan et al 1999). 
However, once we consider the social, economic and organisational consequences of 
codification,  some  disadvantages  also  appear.  In  the  first  place,  codification  is 
expensive,  it  takes  time,  knowledge engineering,  and  so  on.  An  expert  is tied  up 
during knowledge acquisition. 
Furthermore, whereas  tacit knowledge  tends to evolve naturally, explicitly written 
down knowledge becomes ossified. It has to be maintained, kept up to date. That is all 
very expensive, especially when the domain is very dynamic. 
Thirdly,  where  trade  secrets  or  the  competitive  advantage  of  confidentiality  are 
involved, a store of codified knowledge is much leakier. It can simply be emailed to a 
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And  finally,  explicit  knowledge  is  much  harder  to  apply  than  fully  internalised 
knowledge. Consulting a manual, or downloading material, is much more difficult. 
Tacit  knowledge  often  includes  much  about  its  own  application.  With  explicit 
knowledge, not only does the information have to be retrieved, but the user needs to 
know which information is important, and where it can be found (Cowan et al 1999). 
So codification of any kind usually involves big and important tradeoffs. 
·  How is the knowledge to be secured? Do we want to go to law, get a patent? If 
we do, then the knowledge is public, it can be reverse engineered. If not, we 
have no comeback or protection? Do we need it? 
·  How is the knowledge likely to be lost to the organisation? Will it leave with 
its owner? Or is it more likely to be appropriated if we write it down? 
·  What is the knowledge worth to us? If it is tacit, then we will ultimately have 
to pay its owner more or less what it is worth to us. The labour market thus 
becomes a substitute for a knowledge market. How should we maximise our 
return on our knowledge acquisition or training expenditure? 
·  And not least, who benefits from codification? If we codify tacit knowledge, 
then we take much of its previous owner’s economic power away from him. 
He  used  to  be  the  monopoly  supplier  of  that  knowledge  within  the 
organisation. But when we codify his knowledge, it is readily available. What 
incentives could he possibly have for cooperating? 
That brings us onto the economics of the situation. As we noted earlier, knowledge 
acquisition  –  codification  –  is  expensive,  but  the  expenses  vary  depending  on  a 
number of factors. Is there a code in place? Or will we have to create one? How 
adequate are the available codes? Will they prevent the codification going well? 
Is there a consensus in the domain, or are there disputed views? Particularly in large 
corporations,  different  sectors,  R&D,  marketing,  engineering,  assembly,  will 
conceptualise a domain very differently. If there is a dispute, then the operation of 
codification may involve taking sides. The chosen code may favour one side or the 
other. The person or team in charge of codification is at an enormous advantage in 
particular if it is party to the dispute. This is particularly important with respect to 
ontologies, which are supposedly shared conceptualisations of a domain. How are we 
to model disputes, when the actual content of the dispute may itself be disputed? Are 
there authorities to whom we can turn? Who accepts their authority? 
And there are many different types of knowledge. For example, it can be taxonomic 
or hierarchical, encoded in diagrammatic form, distributed across an organisation, or 
it  can  be  procedural  knowledge.  How  can  we  deal  with  these  different  kinds  of 
knowledge? Are some trickier than others? Are some types so hard to model that our 
models will always be too coarse and expensive (Brewster & O’Hara 2004)? 
We can see some of these factors if we take an example from the early days of expert 
systems.  Problem-solving  methods  (PSMs)  were  recurrent  patterns  in  expert 
reasoning,  that  could  be  applied  in  different  expert  systems  in  different  domains 
(Chandrasekaran 1983, Clancey 1985, Wielinga et al 1992). Such methods included 
hierarchical classification, systematic diagnosis, and propose and revise design. They 
could be used as skeletal expert systems, such that if they were filled in with domain 
knowledge,  they  could  be  used  for  problem-solving.  Similarly,  they  could  direct 
knowledge acquisition by telling the knowledge engineer what knowledge to acquire, O’Hara    Ontologies and Technologies  5 
and signposting what type of knowledge is required for problem-solving (O’Hara et al 
1998,  van  Heijst  1995).  In  other  words,  the  PSM  contains  within  it  ontological 
specifications. 
However,  these  specifications  are  highly  task-specific.  There  is  no  guarantee  that 
these ontological forms will be translatable for other tasks, or that the knowledge so 
painfully acquired could be easily reused for another task. When knowledge has a 
procedural  element,  there  may  well  be  difficulties  in  understanding  how  that 
knowledge could be reused, even partially, for other tasks. In general, the lesson is 
that certain types of knowledge (for example taxonomic knowledge) may well be 
easier to put into ontologies than others. 
Given these thoughts about codification, how do they leave our questions about the 
Semantic Web and information retrieval? Are there questions raised by this which 
have yet to be properly addressed in the SW community? 
Let’s look at how we might expect the SW to be used. Corporations, organisations use 
knowledge technologies to help them make sense of a chaotic, uncertain world. They 
want  the  best  support  for  their  decision-making  and  problem-solving.  They  often 
operate  in  dynamic,  disputed,  contentious  domains.  They  have  only  incomplete 
information, often in inconvenient form. What they want from their technologies is 
timely interpretations of the evidence to let them make reliable decisions, and to let 
them act effectively. Are ontologies the right things here? 
They aren’t very good at representing disputes and divergence, since they are shared 
and agreed conceptualisations of domains. They need to be available quickly as the 
domain  changes,  but  they  are  usually  painstakingly  hand-crafted.  There  is  little 
automation of development. They are hard to maintain. It is hard to remove out-of-
date information, because it is hard to work out what depends on what within an 
ontology (Buckingham Shum 2004). 
If we look at how organisations actually use ontologies, we find little consensus on 
what an ontology actually is. They tend to involve hierarchical taxonomies, but other 
than that, almost anything goes. What corporations tend to do with ontologies is to 
systematise  large  volumes  of  knowledge,  for  example  to  do  with  research  and 
development programmes. The ontology therefore looks like a hierarchical corporate 
memory. Interestingly, knowledge is much more usually put in than retrieved. 
Perhaps  more  interestingly,  the  big  research  issues  as  seen  from  industry  are 
correspondingly different from those that excite the scientists. They include security 
and  ownership,  trust,  how  to  communicate  to  different  audiences,  the  intended 
audience in particular, and what media will be used for browsing and viewing. Hence 
the major challenge from the corporate user’s point of view is not representational 
adequacy, but rather the social context of use. How should this system integrate with 
other  systems,  computational  or  otherwise?  How  should  content  be  acquired  or 
designed (Ellman 2004)? 
So when we look at the use of ontologies in the SW from the viewpoint of its social 
context, we start to see a different set of problems emerging. 
·  Which knowledge should we be representing? And how? And what are the 
limits of our capabilities to do that? How disabling will those limits be? 
·  Whose knowledge are we taking? Are we disturbing patterns of ownership, 
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·  Should we try to represent dispute? How consensual should ontologies be? 
·  Can there be personal ontologies, and what use would they be? 
·  How do the costs of knowledge transfer get allocated in the new world? Who 
pays? 
·  And finally, what do we do about maintenance? Who is responsible for the 
maintenance of knowledge repositories or ontologies? And how do we prevent 
those people injecting their own biases into the mix? 
To conclude, let us consider two models of economic activity (cf Fuller 2002, 36-44). 
Profit seeking is the performance of work to realise future benefits; I invest my time 
now to enable economic activity to take place in the future. This might be designing a 
machine, or writing some program, or inventing a procedure. Profit seeking, in other 
words, is productive. Contrast that with rent seeking, seeking benefit from past work. 
The  trick  is  to  be  in  a  position  to  prevent  productive  activity  from  taking  place. 
Corruption  is  one  of  the  worst  types  of  rent  seeking,  where  an  official,  having 
managed to get himself a  key job in the past, now uses it to cream off bribes from 
those who need to get round the regulations. However, many types of rent seeking are 
legitimate; nevertheless, they all flourish when productive activity can be retarded. 
If we think about rent-seeking and profit-seeking in a knowledge market, we can see 
two possible futures for the SW. The vision of Tim Berners-Lee, the vision that most 
researchers  in  the  area  have,  is  that  of  enabling  new  knowledge-based  activity, 
economic and otherwise, of promoting research, and of boosting the circulation of 
information. 
On the other hand, suppose rigid ontologies ossify outmoded conceptualisations of 
domains. In that case, certain viewpoints within society, and within organisations, 
may become privileged. They could use this privilege to their own advantage, and will 
also act to defend those privileges. Knowledge is power, as they say, and if we find 
difficulty representing all types of knowledge, we risk being party to a skewed and 
unproductive distribution of power. 
That is not necessarily reason to be pessimistic that the vision of the SW will be 
effaced by the nightmare. But we should be wary of the dramatic claims that some 
make about the SW. We shouldn’t try to disguise the important social dimension to 
knowledge. We cannot adopt an epistemological stance free of politics. 
What can we do in future? The main thing is to be alert to potential pitfalls of the 
technology. We can’t predict the future; technological determinism is always a big 
mistake. But we must try to capture knowledge of diverse types from heterogeneous 
sources, support reasoning that is as scruffy as we can bear, support the processes of 
debate and disagreement, and automate ontology construction, V&V, integration etc, 
as far as possible.  
These are all difficult and messy research problems. But the technology will benefit in 
the end. 
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